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THE SCHOFIELD/GUNNER DECISIONS AND 
EPISCOPAL CHURCH PROPERTY-SPLITTING 
LITIGATION: CONSIDERING PROPOSED 
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE LITIGATION PROCESS 
AND THE NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
DOCTRINE, TEN YEARS ON 
TIMOTHY D. WATSON? 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the Episcopal Church in the United States 
has seen a spate of parishes leaving the Church. Many of these 
departing parishes have attempted to take property with them as 
they leave and continue to operate independently or realign them-
selves with a different denomination. The Episcopal Church main-
tains that this property is held by the parishes on behalf of the 
national Church, and has generally been successful in obtaining a 
return of the property through legal action. In deciding these suits, 
state courts have skirted carefully around the contours of ecclesi-
astical questions; many state courts, following the Supreme Court, 
have adopted a Jones v. Wolf neutral principles of law approach 
for determining church property questions. Some commentators, 
after examining the application of the neutral principles approach 
in the Episcopal Church property-splitting context, have argued 
that the results reached by the courts are unjust, and have made 
their own suggestions for how to improve the adjudication process 
to obtain different results. This Note examines some of these sug-
gestions in the context of the lawsuits surrounding the Diocese of 
San Joaquin, California, which span over a decade. The sugges-
tions considered here find no place in the San Joaquin litigation, 
and are simply not applicable in many situations. Even if they 
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were applicable, the suggestions would not improve the neutral prin-
ciples approach, would create incongruities with other areas of law, 
would muddle court analysis, and would not create more just results 
in church property-splitting litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, parishes in the Diocese of San Joaquin (California) 
were some of the first to split off from the Episcopal Church in the 
wake of alleged theological changes, preparing the way for a vast 
array of litigation and resulting scholarship.1 When the Diocese’s 
bishop reassigned the Diocesan property to himself for the use of 
the breakaway parishes, the Episcopal Church sued to recover the 
property.2 Nearly ten years later, in July 2016, after a spate of 
embittered, nationwide litigation, the California Supreme Court 
declined to take the San Joaquin case, leaving the Appellate Court’s 
April 2016 decision in favor of the Episcopal Church intact.3 
Part I of this Note presents a history of the Episcopal 
Church, setting a historical context for schism and identifying the 
assets typically in question during a suit, as well as attempting 
to provide a more robust historical and cultural basis for the con-
flicts, a topic which has been somewhat ignored in prior legal 
scholarship. Part II looks at the development of judicial involve-
ment in church property-splitting in the United States, following 
the progression of the common law from the initial deferential ap-
proach to the modern “neutral principles of law” doctrine, begin-
ning with some of the earliest church property-splitting decisions 
and continuing through to the Diocese of San Joaquin lawsuits. 
Part III highlights a selection of scholarship, which is aimed at 
making suggestions to improve the church property-splitting pro-
cess in an attempt to make the results more just. It then examines 
whether any of these suggestions were incorporated in the judicial 
decisions resulting from the San Joaquin property controversy, 
which is both one of the first, and, at this point, one of the last 
                                                                                                            
1 Laurie Goodstein & Carolyn Marshall, Episcopal Diocese Votes to Secede 
from Church, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03 
/us/03episcopal.html. 
2 Pat McCaughan, San Joaquin Diocese, Episcopal Church file suit to regain 
property, EPISCOPAL CHURCH (Apr. 25, 2008), https://www.episcopalchurch.org 
/library/article/san-joaquin-diocese-episcopal-church-file-suit-regain-property 
[https://perma.cc/U9HD-4TBB]. 
3 ENS Staff, California Supreme Court upholds ruling in San Joaquin prop-
erty case, EPISCOPAL NEWS SERVICE (July 14, 2016), https://www.episcopalnews 
service.org/2016/07/14/california-supreme-court-upholds-ruling-in-san-joaquin 
-property-case/ [https://perma.cc/B4PG-8G7X]. 
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Episcopal Church property-splitting lawsuits resulting from the 
conflicts of the mid-2000s. Finally, for each suggestion examined, it 
will ask one of two questions: if the suggestion was included in some 
way in the court’s decision, how did it affect, or not affect, the outcome 
of the suit?; or, if the suggestion was not included in the court’s de-
cision, would its inclusion likely have had an effect on the outcome? 
I.  THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 
The Episcopal Church is a Christian religious organization 
established in the United States in 1784.4 It is a member of the 
                                                                                                            
4 Diocese of Oregon, History of the American Church, EPISCOPAL CHURCH 
(1999), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/history-american-church [https:// 
perma.cc/VD2U-PMCA]. The Episcopal Church is also known as the Protestant 
Episcopal Church in the United States of America (PECUSA or ECUSA). IAN 
S. MARKHAM & C.K. ROBERTSON, EPISCOPAL QUESTIONS, EPISCOPAL ANSWERS 
84–85 (2014) (“In the early twentieth century, the official name of the corporate 
organization became ‘The Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America’ ... although the 
corporate name remains for official purposes, the Church ... [uses] as its self-
designation ‘The Episcopal Church’ or TEC ....”). What would become The Epis-
copal Church began as a mission of the Diocese of London in the Church of 
England. DAVID HEIN & GARDINER H. SHATTUCK, JR., THE EPISCOPALIANS 35–36 
(Praeger Publishers, Denominations in America No. 11, 2004) (“Anglicanism 
in the colonies was forced to operate as a largely disunited collection of parishes 
under the distant supervision of the bishop of London.”). A priest from the 
Church of England, the Reverend Robert Hunt, accompanied the Virginia 
Company of London’s expedition to North America in 1607 as the expedition’s 
chaplain. SAMUEL WILBERFORCE, A HISTORY OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH IN AMERICA 25 (1844). This expedition founded the Jamestown settle-
ment in the Colony of Virginia (later Jamestown, Virginia); the first Church of 
England sacramental service was celebrated there soon after, with Rev. Hunt 
“administering the holy eucharist [sic] to the united company upon the 14th of 
May, 1607, the day after their first landing.” Id. at 22. The Diocese of London, 
with the support of English voluntary organizations such as the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG) and the Society for Promot-
ing Christian Knowledge (SPCK) continued to send clergyman and monetary 
support to the church in the North American colonies until the outbreak of the 
Revolutionary War in 1775. HEIN & SHATTUCK, supra, at 17, 22, 35–41; Diocese 
of Oregon, supra (discussing American clergy maintaining ties with the SPG 
during the American Revolutionary War). The Church of England, both histor-
ically and presently, is synonymously referred to as the “Anglican Church,” 
“Anglican” meaning “of England,” from the Latin Anglii (English: Angles), the 
name given to the Germanic inhabitants of Britain. Church History, ANGLICAN, 
http://anglican.org/church/ChurchHistory.html [https://perma.cc/L8W9-WYUF]; 
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worldwide Anglican Communion, an organization composed of a 
number of national churches around the world under the leader-
ship of the Archbishop of Canterbury.5 The Episcopal Church is 
headed by a Presiding Bishop, but, unlike, for example, the Roman 
Catholic Church, which has a very top-down leadership structure, 
the individual parishes that make up the Episcopal Church hold 
much of the primary power for self-determination in practice.6 
                                                                                                            
The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, Angle, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Angle-people [https://perma.cc/RVC5-C42N]. 
Due to its historical association with the Church of England, and its present-day 
participation in the Anglican Communion, the terms “Episcopal” and “Angli-
can” are sometimes used interchangeably to refer to the Episcopal Church. See 
THOMAS A. RUSSELL, COMPARATIVE CHRISTIANITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO A 
RELIGION AND ITS DIVERSE TRADITION 185 (2010); see, e.g., Schofield v. Superior 
Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (showing the court refer-
ring to the Episcopal Church as a “regional Anglican church[ ].”). 
5 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) 
(citing Schofield v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)). 
The Archbishop of Canterbury, in addition to being head of the Anglican Commu-
nion, is also the Primate of the Church of England. Id.; see also R. Gregory Hyden, 
Welcome to the Episcopal Church, Now Please Leave: An Analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s Approved Methods of Settling Church Property Disputes in the Context of 
the Episcopal Church and How Courts Erroneously Ignore the Role of the Anglican 
Communion, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 541, 562–68 (2008) (discussing the function 
of the Anglican Communion and its potential application to property disputes). 
6 Governance of the Episcopal Church, HOUSE OF DEPUTIES OF THE EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH, http://houseofdeputies.org/governance-episcopal-church/ [https://perma 
.cc/46K5-PBLQ] (“All major decisions affecting the life of the Episcopal Church 
are made jointly by lay people, clergy and bishops. Parishes elect a vestry to 
govern the affairs of the parish ....”). As the canons of the Episcopal Church 
give property rights to the national church rather than individual dioceses or 
parishes, the organization of the Episcopal Church has been the key point in 
contention in property-splitting lawsuits. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 
P.3d 66, 75 (Cal. 2009) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871)) (in law-
suits “involv[ing] a hierarchical structure, i.e., ‘a religious congregation which 
is itself part of a large and general organization of some religious denomina-
tion, with which it is more or less intimately connected by religious views and 
ecclesiastical government’ ... ‘we are bound to look at the fact that the local 
congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important reli-
gious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by 
its orders and judgments.’”). The Roman Catholic Church in the United States 
has not experienced recent schisms of the same extent as those of the Episcopal 
Church, but in property disputes where the neutral principles of law approach 
is used, the more hierarchically focused polity of the Roman Catholic Church 
has been a militating factor. See, e.g., Blaudziunas v. Egan, 961 N.E.2d 1107, 
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This might, at first glance, appear to be a confederal form of govern-
ment, in which the dioceses, as an association of governments, 
delegate certain powers to a central organization (the General Con-
vention).7 However, the appearance of decentralization is deceptive: 
[The decentralization] does not make the church structurally 
confederal. There is no essential division of power between the 
General Convention and the dioceses. In fact, there is no limit 
at all upon the Convention’s governing powers, unless it be the 
ancient canons and the necessity for conformity with the Cath-
olic Faith; but these are interpreted finally by the General Con-
vention alone. Thus, the government is unitary.8 
Each individual parish is run by a vestry, which is a board 
composed of a number of laypeople elected by the parish; the mem-
bers of the vestry elect a rector, who must be an ordained priest.9 
The Episcopal Church spreads across seventeen countries, but the 
bulk of its membership is located in the United States.10 For ad-
ministrative purposes, the geographic regions of the Episcopal 
Church are broken down into units called dioceses; a bishop is 
appointed to run the affairs of each diocese.11 The Episcopal Church 
currently contains 109 dioceses.12 Each diocesan bishop, in turn, 
                                                                                                            
1108 (N.Y. 2011) (“No act or proceeding of the [trustees of the parish] shall be 
valid without the sanction of the Archbishop.”). 
7 DAVID L. HOLMES, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 55 (1993). 
8 Id. at 55 (quoting James A. Dator, The Government of the Protestant Epis-
copal Church in the United States of America: Confederal, Federal, or Unitary? 
245 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University)). 
9 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55. 
10 About Us, EPISCOPAL CHURCH, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/about  
-us [https://perma.cc/RX6K-6CJR] (listing number of countries with non-domestic 
dioceses); Baptized Members by Province and Diocese 2005–2015, EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH (2016), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/files/documents/baptized_mem 
bers_by_province_and_diocese_2005-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQU7-WGJ5] 
(listing 1,779,335 members in domestic dioceses versus 137,847 members in 
non-domestic dioceses in 2015). 
11 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 71 (Cal. 2009). The diocesan 
bishop typically serves two roles, as a diocese is both “the sphere of jurisdiction 
of a bishop” and “the district under the pastoral care of a bishop.” Diocese, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/53084 
?redirectedFrom=diocese#eid [https://perma.cc/4NJ5-8874]. 
12 About Us, EPISCOPAL CHURCH, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/page/about 
-us [https://perma.cc/RX6K-6CJR]. 
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participates in and reports to the decision-making body of the 
Episcopal Church, the General Convention.13 These three levels 
make up the “three-tiered” hierarchy of the Church: (from bottom 
to top) parish, diocese, General Convention.14 Because of this al-
location of power, there is necessarily a tension between the 
top-down leadership of the bishops in the General Convention and 
the bottom-up control of the individual parishes.15 The General 
Convention passes and periodically updates the Constitution and 
Canons, the binding rules governing the functions of the Episcopal 
Church.16 When a diocese or parish applies to join the Episcopal 
Church, it agrees to adopt a constitution and canons which match 
those of the Episcopal Church.17 
Schism is nothing new in the Episcopal Church. The Church 
of England, from which the Episcopal Church emerged after the 
American Revolution, was a product of the English Reformation.18 In 
1534, England, spearheaded by Henry VIII, declared that the 
churches in England, largely Roman Catholic and under the con-
trol of the Pope in Rome, now belonged to the English crown and owed 
loyalty solely to the king.19 In the intervening 500 years, the Anglican 
Church has seen a continuous stream of separation, notably in-
cluding the separation of the Methodist Church20 and (arguably) 
                                                                                                            
13 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55. 
14 New v. Kroeger, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464, 469–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
15 See supra text accompanying notes 6–14 (discussing these two forms of 
leadership). 
16 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55 (citing Huber v. Jackson, 96 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)); Constitution & Canons: Together with the Rules 
of Order, 2015, EPISCOPAL CHURCH (2016), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/files 
/documents/2015_candc.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BBF-8QD4]. 
17 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55. 
18 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 172–73. 
19 Act of Supremacy 1534, Public Act, 26 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (Eng. and Wales) (“the 
King’s Majesty justly and rightfully is & oweth to be the supreme head of the 
Church of England ... and shall have ... all ... jurisdictions, privileges, authori-
ties, immunities, profits, and commodities.”); Statute in Restraint of Appeals 
1532, 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12 (Eng. and Wales) (making the King the final legal 
authority on matters within national borders and refusing domestic citizens 
the ability to appeal to the Pope or hierarchy of the Church in Rome, on both 
religious and non-religious matters). 
20 HEIN & SHATTUCK, supra note 4, at 27 (“the Methodists separated from 
Anglicanism in 1784 ....”). 
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the Baptist Church,21 the second and first largest protestant de-
nominations in America, respectively.22 The Episcopal Church, in 
particular, had also seen its share of separations prior to the 
twenty-first-century turbulence. The Reformed Episcopal Church 
split off from the Episcopal Church in the late nineteenth century 
due to perceived ecclesiological changes in the Episcopal Church.23 
Several groups broke off in the twentieth century, including, inter 
alia, the American Episcopal Church in 1968 and the Anglican 
Catholic Church in 1977.24 
The last half of the 1990s and the first decade of the 
twenty-first century proved a breaking point for the largest sepa-
ration in the history of the Episcopal Church.25 In 2003, the Dio-
cese of New Hampshire elected Gene Robinson to serve as their 
                                                                                                            
21 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BRACKNEY, BAPTISTS IN NORTH AMERICA: AN HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 22 (2006) (arguing that the most persuasive view of the 
historical origins of the Baptist movement is one that describes the Baptist 
movement, apropos of the Anabaptists, as arising from English Separatism of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). 
22 Fifteen Largest Protestant Denominations, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 7, 
2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/chapter-1-the-changing-religious 
-composition-of-the-u-s/pr_15-05-12_rls_chapter1-03/ [https://perma.cc/L4ZH 
-6ZEY]. In 2014, the Baptist Church (composed of, inter alia, the Southern Baptist 
Convention, the American Baptist Churches USA, and the National Baptist 
Convention) had 8.2 percent of the US population, the United Methodist 
Church had 3.6 percent, and the Episcopal Church had 0.9 percent. Id. 
23 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 172–73. The original break-off party left the 
Episcopal Church largely over concerns of the “Romanizing” influence of the 
Oxford Movement in England. Id. at 173–74. See MIRANDA KATHERINE HASSETT, 
ANGLICAN COMMUNION IN CRISIS: HOW EPISCOPAL DISSIDENTS AND THEIR AFRICAN 
ALLIES ARE RESHAPING ANGLICANISM 30 (2007) (“The nineteenth century brought 
tensions between waves of evangelicalism within the church, inspired by revivals 
around the country, and a movement of liturgically oriented, traditionalist Epis-
copalians that influenced the church strongly in the direction of Anglo-Cathol-
icism. From that time on, the Episcopal Church has been dominated by ... an 
‘Anglo-Catholic hegemony.’”). 
24 MARTYN PERCY, POWER AND THE CHURCH: ECCLESIOLOGY IN AN AGE OF 
TRANSITION 167–68 (1998); see also HOLMES, supra note 7, at 173. 
25 The departure of the Episcopal Diocese of South Carolina alone took 
22,953 members out of the Episcopal Church. About Us, THE PROTESTANT EPIS-
COPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, http://www.dioceseofsc 
.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/GA5V-YJXZ]. The split off of the Reformed Episcopal 
Church in the nineteenth century, in contrast, had only 1,500 communicants 
six months after its separation. ANNIE DARLING PRICE, A HISTORY OF THE 
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bishop.26 Robinson was the first openly gay, non-celibate priest to 
be elected as a bishop in the Anglican tradition.27 Historically, the 
Episcopal Church, along with almost all Christian churches, had 
declared non-celibate homosexuals to be living sinfully,28 but re-
cent revisions of Episcopal church canons reversed this stance 
and allowed parishes first to bless gay unions,29 then later to per-
form weddings for gay couples.30 Some Episcopalians saw this as 
the final straw in a church which, they argued, had been rapidly 
becoming more socially, politically, and theologically liberal.31 
This led many dissenting members to break off their affiliation 
with the Episcopal Church, beginning with individual parishes 
voting to leave the Church.32 The 7,000-member Diocese of San 
                                                                                                            
FORMATION AND GROWTH OF THE REFORMED EPISCOPAL CHURCH 1873–1902 
154 (1902). 
26 STEPHEN BATES, A CHURCH AT WAR: ANGLICANS AND HOMOSEXUALITY 6 
(2004). 
27 Rebecca Leung, Gay Bishop ‘Being Honest’, CBS NEWS (Mar. 4, 2004), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gay-bishop-being-honest-04-03-2004/ [https://per 
ma.cc/D2CX-6ZFE]. 
28 See generally ROBERT E. HOOD, SOCIAL TEACHINGS IN THE EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH 144–59 (1990) (discussing the historical development of views on sex-
uality within the Episcopal Church). 
29 Alison Leigh Cowan, A Moratorium on Weddings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/14/nyregion/a-moratorium-on-weddings.html. 
30 George Conger, The Episcopal Church approves religious weddings for 
gay couples after controversial debates, WASH. POST (July 1, 2015), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/07/01/why-the-episcopal-church 
-is-still-debating-gay-marriage/?utm_term=.5fa242080c63 [https://perma.cc 
/7QGT-VWC8]. 
31 See Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 56 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2016); see also HASSETT, supra note 23, at 1 (“A growing socially conserva-
tive and religiously evangelical orientation among the leaders and members of 
[some Episcopal churches], along with moves to the left by the larger Episcopal 
Church, created a divide that eventually proved irreconcilable.”). This included 
issues such as biblical inerrancy and the epistemic foundation of faith, the or-
dination of women as priests, the appointment of female priests as bishops, the 
acceptability of non-celibate homosexual relationships, ecumenical and interfaith 
relations, and Church affiliation with particular political or economic positions. 
See, e.g., id. at 96–98 (discussing reactions to Episcopal calls for unconditional 
third-world debt relief). 
32 Laurie Goodstein & Carolyn Marshall, Episcopal Diocese Votes to Secede 
From Church, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03 
/us/03episcopal.html. 
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Joaquin, California, was the first diocese to break off from the 
Episcopal Church in the wake of Robinson’s election.33 Under the 
leadership of Bishop John-David Schofield, the diocese voted “over-
whelmingly” to secede from the Episcopal Church.34 Over the next 
few years, many other dioceses and parishes chose to follow a path 
similar to the one taken by San Joaquin.35 Upon leaving the Epis-
copal Church, many of the parishes and dioceses, including the 
Diocese of San Joaquin, took title and possession of the church 
property with them, setting the stage for the ensuing litigation.36 
While some of the formerly Episcopal churches chose to re-
main independent,37 many chose to join the Anglican Church of 
North America, an organization formed in 2009 to maintain the 
Episcopal style of worship while rejecting the alleged theological 
and social changes that had led to the split.38 The Anglican Church 
                                                                                                            
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Laurie Goodstein, Episcopal Split as Conservatives Form New Group, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/us/04episcopal.html. 
36 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58 (“[former Diocese of San Joaquin Bishop] 
Schofield began retitling the 27 parcels of real property in dispute by granting 
them to The Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin, a Corporation Sole.”); see also 
Barbara Bradley Hagerty, A Church Divided: Ruling Ends Va.’s Episcopal Battle, 
NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/10 
/150351713/a-church-divided-ruling-ends-va-s-episcopal-battle (discussing the 
real property kept by several breakaway Virginia parishes). 
37 Report from the Task Force for Provincial Affiliation: Provincial Affiliation 
with the Anglican Church in North America, THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, https://web.archive.org/web/201 
60912090217/http://www.diosc.com/sys/about-us/affiliation/729-report-from-the 
-task-force-for-provincial-affiliation [https://perma.cc/YT3E-W4QC] [hereinafter 
Provincial Affiliation] (discussing the diocese’s reason for remaining indepen-
dent of ACNA). 
38 The Anglican Church of North America is itself a collection of organizations, 
including the Reformed Episcopal Church. Ecumenical Relationships, THE 
REFORMED EPISCOPAL CHURCH, http://www.recus.org/ecumenical.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3KPD-JLL9] (“The Reformed Episcopal Church is a subjurisdiction 
of the Anglican Church of North America.”). Despite recognition by some indi-
vidual Anglican churches, it has not been recognized by, and is not considered 
a member of, the Anglican Communion. Jennifer Berry Hawes, Archbishop 
says ACNA not part of the Anglican Communion, THE POST & COURIER (Oct. 8, 
2014), https://www.postandcourier.com/features/faith_and_values/archbishop 
-says-acna-not-part-of-the-anglican-communion/article_a954ad22-4f70-51ab-8 
ed0-87273a9435c4.html [https://perma.cc/N3RJ-9V8A]. 
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of North America has subsequently associated itself with members 
of the Southern Cone, which is composed largely of South Ameri-
can Anglican churches, and the Global Anglican Future Confer-
ence, which is composed largely of African Anglican churches.39 
This has created an international divide in the Anglican Communion, 
falling mostly along lines of Western countries on one side and 
developing countries on the other, with Africa and South America 
(along with the Americans who have left the Episcopal Church) 
aligning themselves against the “liberal” policies of the churches 
in England, Europe, the United States, and Canada.40 
These splits are not trivial in magnitude. Some commenta-
tors have claimed that winning the lawsuits and regaining prop-
erty are empty victories for the Episcopal Church; its right may 
be vindicated by the court, but it is left with little but empty build-
ings and rows of unused pews, slowly gathering dust.41 This is to 
forget, however, that the assets held by many parishes are com-
prised significantly (if not mostly) of the value of the real estate 
owned by the parish or diocese, which can be a significant sum.42 
                                                                                                            
39 Pat Ashworth, Southern Cone offers haven to disaffected US dioceses, 
CHURCH TIMES (Nov. 14, 2007), https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2007 
/16-november/news/uk/southern-cone-offers-haven-to-disaffected-us-dioceses 
[https://perma.cc/UYA8-2MPU]; Global Movement, GAFCON, https://www.gafcon 
.org/about/global-movement [https://perma.cc/Y7SX-DVYU] (listing member 
countries that include: Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Congo). 
40 See generally HASSETT, supra note 23, at 2–4. 
41 See, e.g., Why is the Episcopal Church near collapse?, BELIEFNET NEWS, 
http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/news/2012/07/why-is-the-episcopal-church 
-near-collapse.php [https://perma.cc/2KX3-YUPB] (“the denomination is the 
proud owner of scores of empty buildings nationwide—and liable for their up-
keep in a depressed real estate market where empty church buildings are less 
than prime property.”) 
42 In 2011, Trinity Wall Street, reputed to be the wealthiest parish in the 
country, estimated that it held over $2 billion in assets, including 14 acres of 
Manhattan real estate and a 26-story skyscraper. Michelle Mazzarella, Plans 
Approved for Trinity Church’s Community Center and Office Tower, CITY REALTY 
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cityrealty.com/nyc/market-insight/features/future-nyc 
/plans-approved-trinity-church039s-community-center-office-tower/14063 [https:// 
perma.cc/UH6X-3MCQ]; Sharon Otterman, Trinity Church Split on How to Man-
age $2 Billion Legacy of a Queen, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/04/25/nyregion/trinity-church-in-manhattan-is-split-on-how-to 
-spend-its-wealth.html; The Rector, Church-Wardens, and Vestrymen of Trinity 
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At a time when the Episcopal Church has seen revenue growth 
fail to outpace inflation, the availability of historical physical as-
sets could make a dramatic difference in the ability of parishes to 
consolidate and remain financially solvent in the future.43 
II.  HISTORY OF CHURCH PROPERTY-SPLITTING 
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Watson v. Jones and the Development of Initial and  
Subsequent Deferential Approaches 
The Supreme Court first ruled on a church property dispute 
in 1871.44 The members of Third, or Walnut Street, Presbyterian 
Church in Louisville, Kentucky, disagreed over the church’s 
stance on slavery after the Civil War, amongst other issues.45 An 
election of elders by the pro-slavery faction was contested by the 
anti-slavery faction.46 In the subsequent fallout, each faction 
claimed ownership and control of the church property.47 The 
                                                                                                            
Church, in the city of New York and Subsidiaries, Consolidated Financial Re-
port, December 31, 2012 and 2011, TRINITY WALL STREET (Apr. 26, 2013), 
https://www.trinitywallstreet.org/sites/default/files/Trinity-Wall-Street-2012 
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/36HX-LE6P] (listing Trinity Wall Street’s financial 
and real assets for the years 2011 and 2012). The Diocese of San Joaquin has 
been reported to hold “tens of millions of dollars” in physical assets, mostly 
composed of real estate. Pablo Lopez, Fresno appeals court says Episcopal 
church properties must be returned, FRESNO BEE (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.fres 
nobee.com/news/local/article70375317.html [https://perma.cc /MD5B-B44U]. 
43 Between 2005 and 2015, total domestic income increased from $2,199,993,228 
to $2,280,563,637, an increase of 3.66 percent. Fast Facts 2005, EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH (2006), https://www.episcopalchurch.org/files/Episcopal_FAST_FACTS 
_2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2RQ-BYLR]; Fast Facts 2015, EPISCOPAL CHURCH 
(2016), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/files/domestic_fast_facts_2015__0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BVP8-XUHV]. During the same period, United States domestic 
inflation increased by a total of 23.44 percent, not seasonally adjusted. 10-Year 
Breakeven Inflation Rate (T10YIE), ECONOMIC RESEARCH, FEDERAL RESERVE 
OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE#0 [https://perma.cc 
/RP8T-GDJQ]. 
44 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
45 Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over 
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1847–48 (1998). 
46 Id. at 1848–50. 
47 Id. at 1848. 
 
722 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:709 
anti-slavery faction sued in federal court to recover title to the 
church property.48 The Supreme Court, after extensive considera-
tion of the constitutionality of ruling on such a case, advocated a 
deferential approach.49 The Supreme Court recognized that many 
church property disputes will be ultimately theological in nature, 
and that American courts are barred on First Amendment grounds 
from deciding such issues.50 Accordingly, the Supreme Court chose 
to defer to the church in question and allow internal church tribunals 
or decision-making apparatus to answer questions concerning 
church property.51 
In 1976, the Supreme Court heard Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 
which concerned the removal of a bishop from his position.52 In 
                                                                                                            
48 Id. 
49 Watson, 80 U.S. at 733–35. 
50 Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 1844–45. 
51 Watson, 80 U.S. at 733–35; see Hyden, supra note 5, at 546–48, 571 (dis-
cussing methods of application of the Watson decision). 
52 Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696 (1976). There were several other ecclesiastical cases between Watson and 
Milivojevich, but each applied the deferential approach as set out in Watson, 
albeit with some clarifications and further discussion. See Bouldin v. Alexan-
der, 82 U.S. 131, 137, 139 (1872) (applying a deferential standard to a dispute 
over the alleged removal of elected trustees of a church); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (ap-
plying a deferential standard, eighty years after the original promulgation, to 
a dispute over the rightful holder of the office of Archbishop in which one party 
had been appointed by the Supreme Church Authority of the Russ. Orthodox 
Church in Moscow, Russia, and the other had been appointed by a convention 
of prelates from a number of Russian Orthodox churches in America). After 
these less influential clarifications, the Court developed a set of “comprehensive 
constitutional restrictions on civil involvement in church property disputes.” 
Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 1855. The first of the cases to begin this clarifi-
cation was the 1969 decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, in which a number 
of Presbyterian churches in Georgia withdrew from the national Presbyterian 
Church in the United States for doctrinal and ecclesiological reasons and 
wished to keep possession of the local church property. Presbyterian Church in 
the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 441–44 (1969); see Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 1855–57. The Court’s 
decision argues that a neutral principles approach might resolve church prop-
erty disputes, but doing so would risk “resolving underlying controversies over 
religious doctrine,” something which is likely to arise in any dispute over church 
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Milivojevich, the hierarchical Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church 
was headquartered (at the time of the suit) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.53 
In 1939, Milivojevich was created Bishop of the American-Canadian 
diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church, based in Illinois.54 The 
Serbian Orthodox Church, after a series conflicts with Bishop 
Milivojevich, removed him as Bishop and defrocked him in 1963.55 
At the same time, the Serbian Orthodox Church split Milivojevich’s 
former diocese into three dioceses and appointed new leader-
ship.56 Milivojevich argued his removal and defrocking, and the 
division of his former diocese, were arbitrary and in contradiction 
to the Church’s internal canons and regulations, both procedurally 
and substantively.57 These decisions were made by the Church’s 
internal judiciary in Yugoslavia, and had been pronounced ac-
cordingly.58 The Milivojevich Court ostensibly applied the former 
deferential standard, but with a noticeable difference.59 While still 
adhering to the deferential approach in theory, the Supreme Court 
created an opening for court interpretation in religious matters, 
saying that courts could not decide a religious issue only when the 
issue or conflict could not be resolved “without extensive inquiry by 
civil courts into religious law and polity ....”60 The Supreme Court 
did not affirmatively specify that courts could (or should) decide 
church disputes, but the language employed significantly entailed 
that the Court was opening the door to a future judicial role in 
religious property disputes.61 
                                                                                                            
separation related to alleged violations of doctrine. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 
393 U.S. at 449. 
53 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 699 (“The Serbian Orthodox Church, one of the 
14 autocephalous, hierarchical churches which came into existence following 
the schism of the universal Christian church in 1054, is an episcopal church 
whose seat is the Patriarchate in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.”). 
54 Id. at 701–02. 
55 Id. at 704–07. 
56 Id. at 703. 
57 Id. at 706. 
58 Id. at 704–06. 
59 See generally id. at 708–26. 
60 Id. at 709. 
61 Id.; Kathleen E. Reeder, Whose Church Is It, Anyway? Property Disputes 
and Episcopal Church Splits, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125, 142–43 (2006). 
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B.  Jones v. Wolf and the Application of “Neutral Principles 
of Law” 
After nearly one hundred years of applying the deferential 
approach from Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court moved from 
Watson to the modern “neutral principles of law” approach in 
Jones v. Wolf.62 In 1979, a majority of the Vineville Presbyterian 
Church in Macon, Georgia broke off from the Augusta-Macon 
Presbytery of the national Presbyterian Church of the United 
States.63 In doing so, the separating majority kept possession of 
the church property and associated with another denomination.64 
The dissenting minority, remaining under the Presbyterian Church 
of the United States, sued to regain possession of the property.65 
The Supreme Court decided that the appropriate method for courts 
to resolve ecclesiastical property disputes was to apply a “neutral 
principles of law” evaluation.66 Going beyond the speculative rul-
ing in Milivojevich, the Supreme Court determined that courts 
could examine “certain religious documents,” such as church can-
ons or constitutions, and decide the case on the basis of these doc-
uments so long as doing so would not require the court to “resolve 
a religious controversy.”67 If deciding the case would require the 
Court to rule upon ecclesiastical questions, this would infringe 
upon the separation of church and state, and the Court would be 
obligated to return in the case to Watson-style deference.68 
1.  In re Episcopal Church Cases 
In the Episcopal Church, the state of California is split into six 
separate dioceses: (from north to south) Northern California, Cal-
ifornia, San Joaquin, El Camino Real, Los Angeles, and San Diego.69 
                                                                                                            
62 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
63 Id at 595. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 604. 
68 Id. 
69 General Convention Office, Provinces of the Episcopal Church, EPISCOPAL 
HEALTH MINISTRIES (1998), http://www.episcopalhealthministries.org/files/file 
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In 2006, when the first Episcopal Church property-splitting case 
reached California courts, the Episcopal dioceses in California 
had a total of 158,200 members.70 The California Supreme Court’s 
first encounter with the twenty-first-century Episcopal Church 
property-splitting cases took place in 2009 with In re Episcopal 
Church Cases.71 This decision arose out of a conflict within St. 
James Parish in the Diocese of Los Angeles.72 In 2004, the vestry 
of St. James Parish voted to break from the Episcopal Church, 
taking the parish’s real property with them, to the exclusion of 
the Diocese.73 The Diocese responded by appointing a new rector 
and asking the parish to surrender the church property; upon the 
parish’s refusal, the Diocese filed suit to regain possession of the 
property.74 While this was the first recent Episcopal Church prop-
erty-splitting case heard by the California Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Court had heard several property-splitting cases involv-
ing other denominations in the past.75 These cases, leading up to 
                                                                                                            
/province-map.jpg [https://perma.cc/MT8S-6SBQ] (showing a geographic break-
down of the dioceses of the Episcopal Church). 
70 Baptized Members by Province and Diocese 2005–2015, supra note 10. 
71 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66 (Cal. 2009). 
72 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
73 Id. A majority of the members of the parish voted for disaffiliation, but a 
minority of members opposed the move. Id. Upon the vote to leave, the parish 
amended its articles of incorporation, adopted upon joining the Episcopal Church 
in 1949, to remove all references to the national Episcopal Church, including a 
1958 diocesan canon stating that parish property would revert to the Diocese 
on the dissolution of the parish. Id. at 850–51. 
74 Id. The dissenting minority of the parish joined the Diocese in the suit. 
Id. at 850. 
75 Id. at 854–57. These cases included Baker v. Ducker, Wheelock v. First 
Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles, and Horsman v. Allen. Id. Baker, an 1889 
case, involved the First Reformed Church of Stockton, California, which incor-
porated as part of the Reformed Church, with the incorporation documents 
specifically making reference to Calvinist theology. Some years later, the con-
gregation had shifted to a largely Lutheran theological structure, and accordingly 
changed the church’s incorporation to reflect this, renaming it the German Lu-
theran Zion Society. The remaining members of the Reformed tradition sued 
to recover the property. Baker v. Ducker, 79 Cal. 365 (1889). Wheelock, an 1897 
case, involved a dispute with the First Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles. 
Upon receiving a sum of money, two parties within the church disputed the 
way in which it should be used. The minority party appealed to the national 
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the decision in Horsman, developed the deferential approach and 
ended up closely mirroring the result from Watson.76 In subsequent 
cases, the California Appellate Courts began to move towards the 
neutral principles approach; tracking, with some delay, the changes 
in the U.S. Supreme Court and leaving behind the former California 
Supreme Court rulings which established the deferential approach 
in the state.77 The seminal change came with In re Episcopal 
Church Cases, in which the California Supreme Court explicitly 
affirmed the use of the Jones “neutral principles of law” evalua-
tion.78 This came after an extended period during which California 
courts, mostly at the appellate level—though occasionally includ-
ing the Supreme Court—had begun to lean towards a more inter-
ventionist approach to church property dispute litigation.79 In In 
re Episcopal Church Cases, the California Supreme Court agreed 
with the Appellate Court’s ruling, but felt that the Appellate Court 
had placed too much emphasis on prior California rulings to the 
exclusion of the more recent U.S. Supreme Court updates.80 Accord-
ingly, the California Supreme Court decided to formally introduce 
the neutral principles approach, stating that “to the extent the 
court can resolve a property dispute without reference to church 
doctrine, it should apply neutral principles of law.”81 In doing so, 
                                                                                                            
Presbyterian Church’s tribunal, which ruled partially in favor of the minority 
party and ordered the church to split into two congregations. The majority 
party, which had control of the money, refused to pay. Wheelock v. First Pres-
byterian Church of Los Angeles, 119 Cal. 477 (1897). Horsman, a 1900 case, 
involved a Church of the United Brethren in Christ in Tulare County. Two 
parties emerged in the church, the “radicals” and the “liberals.” The national 
church split along these lines, and the local branches followed. The “radicals” 
in Tulare County sued to recover land held by the “liberals.” Horsman v. Allen, 
129 Cal. 131 (1900). 
76 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 854–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
77 Id. at 866–68. 
78 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 73–74 (Cal. 2009). 
79 See, e.g., Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Nonsectarian 
Church, 39 Cal. 2d 121, 131 (1952) (noting that “[t]he general rule that courts 
will not interfere in religious societies with reference to their ecclesiastical prac-
tices stems from the separation of the church and state, but has always been 
qualified by the rule that civil and property rights would be adjudicated.”). 
80 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d at 81. 
81 Id. at 79. 
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the court should consider “sources such as the deeds to the prop-
erty in dispute, the local church’s articles of incorporation, the 
general church’s constitution, canons, and rules ....”82 Applied to 
St. James Parish, the court found that the parish’s early choice to 
submit to the constitution and canons of the Episcopal Church 
was dispositive.83 The Episcopal Church had altered its canons, 
largely in response to Jones v. Wolf, to “[make] clear that a local 
parish owns local church property in trust for the greater church 
and may use that property only so long as the local church remains 
part of the greater church.”84 St. James Parish had voluntarily 
chosen to submit to these rules, and thus the parish property 
rightfully belonged to the national church.85 
C.  Schofield v. Superior Court and Diocese of San Joaquin 
v. Gunner 
The story of the Diocese of San Joaquin is similar to that of 
many breakaway Episcopal dioceses and parishes across the coun-
try. In an interview, the newly appointed Bishop of the Anglican 
Diocese of San Joaquin (composed of former members of the Epis-
copal Church Diocese), Dr. Eric Vawter Menees, recounted the inter-
nal disputes that led up to the diocesan retreat from the Episcopal 
Church.86 Dr. Menees described the ordination of Gene Robinson 
as the catalyst of the secessionist movement in the Diocese.87 He 
cited a high level of support in the diocese for leaving the Episco-
pal Church, claiming that over ninety-five percent of the members 
of the Diocese supported the decision to depart.88 In a statement 
given at the Diocese’s 2007 convention, after which the Diocese voted 
to leave the Episcopal Church, then-Bishop John-David Schofield 
recounted watching the Episcopal Church “lose its way” for more 
                                                                                                            
82 Id. at 70. 
83 Id. at 82. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 86. 
86 Scott Carpenter, Legal battle hinges on California’s High Court, UNION DEMO-
CRAT (July 6, 2016), http://www.uniondemocrat.com/localnews/4485344-151/le 
gal-battle-hinges-on-californias-high-court [https://perma.cc/J5X2-6T25]. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
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than twenty years, “dismissing the word of God” and making “uni-
lateral decisions about theology, sexuality, and ordination” which 
cut it off from the rest of the Anglican Communion.89 Encouraged 
by the example set by the string of parishes and dioceses breaking 
off across the country, he urged the members of the Diocese to 
vote for secession.90 On December 7, 2007, forty of the forty-seven 
parishes in the Diocese voted to leave the Episcopal Church.91 
Preparing a plan to leave as early as 2005, the Diocese had slowly 
begun to amend its canons away from those of the national Epis-
copal Church, “in an attempt to protect its property” from future 
seizure by the national church.92 On January 22, 2008, Schofield 
amended the articles of incorporation for the Diocese, renaming 
it “The Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin (A Corporation Sole).”93 
Soon after, the Episcopal Church removed Bishop Schofield from 
his office and elected Jerry Lamb as a provisional bishop of the 
minority of parishes which did not secede.94 With diocesan ap-
proval, Lamb quickly proceeded to amend the Diocese’s articles of 
incorporation again, revoking Schofield’s earlier changes.95 In re-
sponse, Schofield began retitling the real property occupied by the 
secessionist parishes to The Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin (A 
Corporation Sole), and from there, granting the property to the 
Anglican Diocese Holding Corporation; created by Schofield spe-
cifically as an attempt to protect the property from seizure.96 The 
holding corporation explicitly listed itself as the Holding Corpora-
tion for the Diocese of San Joaquin, “a diocese ... of the Anglican 
Province of the Southern Cone,” another (mostly South American) 
portion of the Anglican Communion.97 
                                                                                                            
89 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016) (quoting John-David Schofield, Address to the Convention, Diocese of 
San Joaquin (Dec. 7, 2007)). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 57. 
92 Id. at 56. 
93 Id. at 57. 
94 Id. at 54. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 57. 
 
2018] SCHOFIELD/GUNNER DECISIONS 729 
In April 2008, Lamb requested on behalf of the Episcopal 
Diocese that Schofield return all real and personal property taken 
by the secessionist parishes.98 After Schofield refused to do so, the 
Episcopal Church and the Diocese joined in suing to recover the 
property.99 After a number of amended complaints, the trial court 
granted summary judgment to the Diocese.100 The trial court de-
termined that the secessionist party’s actions (including the amend-
ments to the Diocese’s governing documents) were “ultra vires and 
impermissible under the constitution and canons of the national 
church.”101 Schofield responded by filing a writ of mandamus.102 
The appellate court determined that summary judgment was im-
proper: any questions that required the court to determine whether 
Schofield or Lamb was properly the bishop of the Diocese were 
fundamentally religious in nature, and, thus, the court was 
blocked from adjudication on First Amendment grounds.103 Aside 
from this, however, civil jurisdiction was “properly invoked to re-
solve issues concerning property transfers” made by Schofield 
while he was unquestionably the bishop.104 With this in mind, the 
appellate court granted the writ and remanded the suit, instruct-
ing the trial court to determine any property disputes using neu-
tral principles of law in line with Jones and the recently decided 
Episcopal Church Cases.105 
On remand, the trial court refused a second motion for sum-
mary judgment by the Diocese.106 Soon after, however, John-David 
Schofield died before the case could be tried on remand; his personal 
representative, Kevin Gunner, took Schofield’s place in the suit.107 
                                                                                                            
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Schofield, No. 08 CECG 01425, 2009 WL 
9442332, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 21, 2009). 
101 Schofield v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
102 Id. at 161. 
103 Id. at 165. 
104 Id. at 166. 
105 Id. at 166–67. 
106 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Schofield, No. 08CECG01425, 2013 WL 
7331710, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2013). 
107 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016). 
 
730 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:709 
After a full adjudication, the trial court ruled in favor of the Diocese 
and the national church in an unreported 2013 opinion.108 Dis-
pleased with the results, Gunner appealed the decision, arguing, 
inter alia, that the trial court failed to use the neutral principles 
of law approach and “erred in deferring to the Episcopal Church’s 
experts.”109 The California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District 
agreed: the trial court, erroneously interpreting the appellate 
court’s past opinion, did not apply neutral principles of law.110 Ad-
ditionally, the trial court improperly decided to defer to the Epis-
copal Church as a hierarchical organization, thus accepting the 
Church’s stance that a diocese may not unilaterally leave the 
Episcopal Church.111 This decision requires “extensive inquiry 
into church polity” and is thus beyond the court’s secular jurisdic-
tion.112 Even if deference and the ecclesiastical determination 
were appropriate, deciding whether or not a diocese may unilat-
erally leave the Church does not resolve the property dispute in 
question.113 This left the appellate court to apply neutral princi-
ples of law on its own. The court dealt first with the Diocese’s real 
property, and second with the Diocese’s personal property.114 
As noted, the property of the Diocese was held in a corpo-
ration sole, and one purpose of using such an entity is to “ensure 
                                                                                                            
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 60. Gunner also argued that the Episcopal Church should be col-
laterally estopped from arguing that the trial court properly decided the case 
because of an Episcopal Church property-splitting suit in Illinois. Diocese of 
Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 14 N.E.3d 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); see Gunner, 
202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 60. Quincy was decided soon after the remanded Schofield 
trial court ruling, and involved another secessionist Diocese leaving with 
church property. See generally Quincy, 14 N.E.3d at 1245. There, however, the 
trial court ruled in favor of the breakaway group and the appellate court af-
firmed. Id. Despite the different result, the Gunner court determined that due 
to differences in Illinois law, the method of incorporation of the Illinois diocese, 
and the methods in which the Diocese of Quincy held title to its property, the 
case did not present the “identical issue” required for collateral estoppel. Gun-
ner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 60–61. 
110 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 61–62. 
111 Id. at 63. 
112 Id. (quoting Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 14 N.E.3d 1245, 
1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)). 
113 Id. at 63. 
114 Id. at 66–67. 
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the continuation of ownership of property dedicated to the benefit 
of a religious organization that may be held in the name of its 
titular head.”115 There is a clear distinction between the corpora-
tion itself and the current officeholder; the officeholder deals with 
the assets only on behalf of the religious organization.116 So, while 
Schofield remained chief officer of the corporation sole, he did not 
have authority to make his amendment to the articles of incorpo-
ration because the religious organization governed by the corpo-
ration (here, the Diocese) had not authorized the amendment.117 
Additionally, the canons of the Diocese stipulated the name of the 
corporation sole. To effectively change the name, Schofield needed 
to have the diocesan convention vote first to approve a change to 
the canons and constitution, and after that change, vote to amend 
the title of the corporation sole.118 Schofield’s first set of deed 
grants were invalid because Schofield’s attempt to rename the 
corporation sole failed; accordingly, when he granted the deeds to 
the “Anglican Bishop of San Joaquin,” no organization of this 
name actually existed.119 Schofield’s later transfer of the deeds from 
the new corporation sole to the Anglican Diocese Holding Company 
was also null because the ability to transfer to the Holding Company 
was contingent upon the transfer to the corporation sole being suc-
cessful.120 After this point, all transfers made by Schofield were in-
valid because he had been removed from his position as bishop, 
and with that his position as incumbent of the corporation sole.121 
The personal property involved in the dispute was the money 
held in the Diocese’s investment accounts at Merrill Lynch.122 
Schofield created a new account with Merrill Lynch in the name 
of his holding company, and instructed Merrill Lynch to transfer 
the diocesan investment accounts to his new account.123 These 
transfers came after Schofield had been removed from his position, 
                                                                                                            
115 Id. at 65. 
116 Id. at 65. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 66–67. 
120 Id. at 67. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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and, thus, he lacked the authority to make these transfers.124 Hav-
ing gone through the neutral principles of law analysis, the court 
determined that all property—both real and personal—remained 
with the Diocese and the Episcopal Church, and accordingly affirmed 
the trial court’s judgment.125 
III.  IMPROVING NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES 
The agonizing division amongst the Anglican Communion 
continues, but as of the writing of this Note, the spree of property 
litigation—and to some extent the attempts of large property-holding 
groups to leave the Episcopal Church—seems to have died down.126 
Accordingly, it seems an appropriate time to reflect back upon some 
of the early suggestions concerning ways to improve the Episcopal 
Church property-splitting litigation, and to examine the extent to 
which these suggestions were, or were not, considered during the 
subsequent litigation. 
A.  Scholarship and Suggestions 
Many years before the current Episcopal Church prop-
erty-splitting controversies began, scholarly articles began weighing 
in with suggested improvements and changes to the Jones v. Wolf 
neutral principles of law approach.127 Numerous commentators 
who believed this approach to be problematic offered solutions, or if 
not solutions, at least alleged improvements to the current law 
and process surrounding church property litigation. Some focused 
on leaving behind the framework of the neutral principles ap-
proach and either prescribing an alternative system, or removing 
the decision from the courts entirely.128 Alternatively, others argued 
                                                                                                            
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Compare search results for “Anglican Communion Property Litigation” 
between January 1, 2017 and January 1, 2018, GOOGLE [https://perma.cc/AP6A 
-Z64E], with “Anglican Communion Property Litigation” between January 1, 
2015 and January 1, 2016, GOOGLE [https://perma.cc/M3GC-SCVT]. 
127 See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Sec-
ular and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (1986). 
128 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 1843 (1998); Calvin Massey, Church 
Schisms, Church Property, and Civil Authority, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 23 (2010). 
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for keeping the neutral principles approach, but making changes 
to reach a more equitable system.129 The number and variety of 
the suggestions make it unreasonable to discuss even a substan-
tial portion of them in a paper of this length. Accordingly, this 
analysis selects a number of the suggestions which would poten-
tially be applicable within the current neutral principles doctrine. 
These suggestions mainly concern adding additional factors or 
considerations to the adjudication process with a hope of, it would 
seem, removing some of the alleged institutional bias inherent in 
the neutral principles doctrine. The discussion will focus on the 
suggestions of two specific papers: Whose Church Is It, Anyway? 
by Kathleen Reeder130 and Welcome to the Episcopal Church, Now 
Please Leave by R. Gregory Hyden.131 
1.  Reeder 
Reeder’s paper is the earlier of the two, and Hyden draws 
from it in his work.132 Reeder argues that the neutral principles 
approach to Episcopal Church property-splitting leads to a “fore-
gone conclusion” in which the national Church and diocese retain 
ownership of the diocesan property.133 This, Reeder believes, is 
unjust, because the parishes “often lose the very properties they have 
purchased, improved, and maintained.”134 Accordingly, she offers 
five “salient factors” which, she argues, courts should consider in 
adjudicating Episcopal Church property disputes.135 The five fac-
tors are: 1) assessments to the diocese; 2) the purchase and mainte-
nance of property; 3) expectations of parishioner-donors; 4) change 
in membership between approval of the canons and present-day 
disputes; and 5) the lack of bargaining power for new churches.136 
                                                                                                            
129 See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform Ap-
plication of “Neutral Principles” in the Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 
32 ST. LOUIS L.J. 263 (1987). 
130 Reeder, supra note 61. 
131 Hyden, supra note 5. 
132 Id. at 542 n.8. 
133 Reeder, supra note 61, at 157. 
134 Id. at 158. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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2.  Hyden 
Hyden argues that “courts either do not understand or 
simply ignore the role the wider Anglican Communion plays in 
Episcopal polity.”137 To Hyden, this is, in fact, the “greatest short-
coming” of the Episcopal Church property-splitting lawsuits.138 
Hyden makes general suggestions for improving the litigation 
process, but sums up recommendations by saying that within the 
Anglican context, the flexibility of his recommendations should 
allow courts to “determine the living structure between the parish 
and the Episcopal Church within the Anglican Communion.”139 The 
only one of Hyden’s “principles” which explicitly brings in a con-
sideration of the Anglican Communion is the second principle.140 
This principle suggests that courts adopt the “Living Relationship 
Test” from the Ohio Appellate Court, which “looks beyond ordi-
nary indicia of property ownerships expressed in deeds, articles 
of incorporation and like documents, and examines the rituals 
and practices of the church in dispute to determine the govern-
mental relationship or polity prevailing.”141 This would allow 
courts to consider a parish’s refusal to pay annual assessments to 
the national church, their refusal to accept their bishop’s author-
ity, and other actions which show their “desire to not remain loyal 
to the diocese.”142 This would also allow courts to “give weight to 
the fact” that some secessionist Episcopal parishes realigned 
themselves with other parts of the Anglican Communion.143 Be-
cause of this realignment, Hyden argues that the property in con-
test “is not being withdrawn from the international church.”144 
                                                                                                            
137 Hyden, supra note 5, at 563. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 572. 
140 Id. at 571–72. 
141 Id. at 570–71 (quoting S. Ohio State Exec. Offices of Church of God v. 
Fairborn Church of God, 573 N.E.2d 172, 182–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)). 
142 Id. at 571. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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B.  Utilization and Non-Utilization of Suggestions in the  
Gunner/Schofield Controversy 
1.  Reeder 
In Gunner, the appellate court was required to redo the en-
tire neutral principles of law application that the trial court failed 
to perform,145 so if Reeder’s factors would come into play, the 
court’s application should be visible here. However, the first prob-
lems with Reeder’s suggestions appear in their very applicability 
to Gunner and other similar property-splitting suits. Reeder as-
sumes that courts will “rely heavily on the ... implied trust doc-
trine.”146 Thus, Reeder’s factors are tailored to a court examining 
the presence or absence of an implied trust.147 But in Gunner, the 
court expressly rejects this approach.148 “Implying a trust almost 
inevitably puts the civil courts squarely in the midst of ecclesias-
tical controversies,” forcing courts “to determine which faction 
continued to adhere to the ‘true’ faith.”149 Doing so would put 
courts expressly into prohibited ecclesiastical territory.150 Since 
no implied trust is at issue in the case, it is therefore unsurprising 
that the Gunner court does not consider any of Reeder’s factors.151 
2.  Hyden 
In the Gunner opinion, and the opinions leading up to it, 
there is no mention of the Anglican Communion.152 This, of course, 
comports with Hyden’s statement that courts often “simply ig-
nore” the role of the Anglican Communion.153 The court in Gunner 
                                                                                                            
145 Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016). 
146 Reeder, supra note 61, at 157. 
147 Id. at 157–58. 
148 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 See generally Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
152 See id.; Schofield v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
153 Hyden, supra note 5, at 563. 
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(following the California Supreme Court) also did not employ the 
Living Relationship Test that Hyden advocates.154 Unlike Reeder’s 
suggestions, Hyden’s suggestion would at least be applicable in 
Gunner if the court had chosen to use it because the breakaway 
parishes of the Diocese of San Joaquin realigned with a group 
composed of members of the Anglican Communion.155 
C.  Theoretical Efficacy of the Suggested Improvements 
1.  Reeder 
The factors that Reeder suggests vary in hypothetical dif-
ficulty of application. The first four are parish- or diocese-specific—
assessments to the diocese, the purchase and maintenance of 
property, expectations of parishioner-donors, and change in mem-
bership between approval of the canons and present-day disputes—
while the last, the lack of bargaining power for new churches, is a 
generalization presumably based on the age of the parish.156 
The expectations of parishioner-donors is perhaps the most 
difficult to apply. As Reeder notes, only the intentions of presently 
living donors who are currently active participants in the parish 
are readily measurable.157 Considering that some parishes in the 
United States have been in existence for over 350 years, the cur-
rent donors have likely made only a fraction of the donations that 
have contributed to the parish’s assets over time.158 Also, as seen 
in Gunner, many of the Episcopal Church parishes in the central 
and western parts of the United States started as missions, in 
which existing dioceses and parishes would provide funds to start 
parishes in newly settled areas.159 Looking at the intent of donors 
in such a situation would be particularly difficult. Additionally, 
funding for many of the parishes in the original English colonies 
in North America came from the Church of England and volun-
tary societies run by English citizens, such as the SPCK and the 
                                                                                                            
154 Compare Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d, with Hyden, supra note 5, at 570–71. 
155 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 57. 
156 Reeder, supra note 61, at 158–59. 
157 Id. at 163–64. 
158 HEIN & SHATTUCK, supra note 4, at 16. 
159 Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55. 
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SPG.160 This complicated history of donations,161 presumably not 
well-documented, would make any analysis of donor intent ex-
tremely messy; based on availability bias,162 it seems likely that 
such an analysis would skew heavily in favor of recent donors. 
Every court considering such a factor would have to make a choice 
regarding whom to include in its expectations analysis. Hyden 
raises very similar concerns about Reeder’s suggestion to look at 
the intent of donors.163 Reeder is entirely unconcerned about such 
bias: the “interests of temporally distant owners are not the pri-
mary concern.”164 This is, of course, a value judgment. However, 
even if historical donors are set aside, a hypothetical should illus-
trate that this exclusion does not solve the problems inherent in 
the suggestion. 
Suppose a parish has 100 members. Among these parish-
ioners, there is one major donor who has given several million 
dollars to the parish, while the other 99 members have each given 
less than $100 per year. If this was the status quo at the time of 
the property-splitting adjudication, how would a court evaluate 
the expectations of these parishioner-donors? Reeder, for some 
reason, thinks that this choice should be “fairly straightforward,” 
but fails to provide even an inkling of how this process should 
work.165 Should each parishioner get one vote? This would ignore 
that the vast majority of donated money came from one person. 
Should votes be allocated by amount donated? This seems undem-
ocratic, and figuring out just how much each parishioner donated 
could be difficult, especially in parishes with lifelong members 
who have donated over the course of seventy years, or more. What 
if the single major donor had a well-known preference, but had 
died or left the parish prior to adjudication? Even without this 
extreme distribution in donations, problems still remain. Should 
members who do not donate get a vote? Should donors who are 
not members get a vote? Should people who have been members 
of the parish for many years get more votes than members who 
                                                                                                            
160 HEIN & SHATTUCK, supra note 4, at 16, 22, 35–41. 
161 See id. at 38. 
162 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 163. 
163 Hyden, supra note 5, at 564–65. 
164 Reeder, supra note 61, at 163. 
165 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 163. 
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joined less than a week before litigation? Do children get votes? 
Do clergy get to vote? And once vote allocation has been decided, 
what would the standard be for determining expectations? Should 
a majority control the decision? A supermajority? A unanimous 
vote? Deciding any one of these questions could have a dramatic 
impact on the court’s analysis, and could swing the expectations 
wildly in one way or another. But Reeder provides no indication 
of how this should work. 
Reeder’s next factor is assessments to dioceses.166 Her ar-
gument is roughly that the “voluntary” nature of assessments to 
dioceses, if examined by courts, would show that parishes have 
autonomy on a day-to-day basis, and, thus, courts should be will-
ing to give the parishes control over property after succession.167 
It is unclear why this day-to-day autonomy would have any im-
pact on a hypothetical court’s decision, and Reeder does not pro-
vide any explanation. It is well known that the Episcopal Church 
tends to delegate the majority of its power to the parish level.168 
This delegation, however, does nothing to change the fundamen-
tal polity and power structure of the Episcopal Church.169 Nor 
does it do anything to change the contractual relationships which 
govern the operation of the parishes and dioceses.170 Reeder 
would have courts focus on this nebulous concept of autonomy,171 
presumably to the exclusion of explicit, easily ascertainable con-
tractual relationships. 
Reeder’s next factor asks courts to look at the name under 
which property is held, and the source of funding which allowed 
for the creation of the buildings.172 Reeder believes that “[i]t 
would be manifestly unjust if the diocese held legal ownership of 
                                                                                                            
166 Reeder, supra note 61, at 159. 
167 See id. at 160 (noting that the funds generated from assessments are 
voluntary commitments). 
168 See Governance of the Episcopal Church, supra note 6 (describing the 
governance structure of the Episcopal Church). 
169 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 160. 
170 See Governance of the Episcopal Church, supra note 6 (describing the 
governance structure of the Episcopal Church). 
171 Reeder, supra note 61, at 161 (“Courts could give this day-to-day auton-
omy more weight in the resolution of church property matters.”). 
172 Id. 
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real property that the parish wholly financed.”173 Reeder cites a 
restaurant franchise example in an explanatory footnote for this 
factor.174 Again, this would favor a nebulous concept of intent over 
the actual contractual relationship which the diocese and parishes 
agreed to. The franchise argument, while interesting, is not a par-
ticularly viable parallel. Notably, the franchise in question pre-
sumably did not agree to a contract which placed ownership of its 
property in implied trust with the franchisor, as courts have often 
found to be the case in the Episcopal Church’s Dennis Canon.175 
Reeder also bases her argument on an assumption that parishes 
generally fund the creation of their own buildings without outside 
monetary support.176 This may be accurate in some cases, but as 
noted above, the presence of foreign donations, grants from the na-
tional Church, and current or past mission-status of many par-
ishes directly contradicts this assumption in many cases.177 The 
California Supreme Court, commenting on the exact concern that 
Reeder raises, concludes that “[a]lthough the deeds to the prop-
erty have long been in the name of the local church, that church 
agreed from the beginning of its existence to be part of the greater 
church and to be bound by its governing documents.”178 
Reeder’s final two factors are Change in Membership be-
tween Approval of Canons and Present-Day Disputes and Lack of 
Bargaining Power for Missions.179 Both factors essentially involve 
a claim that the present membership of the parish in question 
may not have freely consented to the canons of the Episcopal 
Church. In the former, this lack of consent is based on potential 
changes in membership, so that the current members did not vote 
for the diocese adopting the canons.180 In the latter, the lack of 
consent is based on the idea that new parishes have no real choice 
                                                                                                            
173 Id. (asserting that Episcopal churches frequently purchased real prop-
erty and structures without assistance from the diocese). 
174 Id. at 161 n.173. 
175 Id. at 126–27. 
176 Id. at 162. 
177 In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 70 (Cal. 2009). 
178 Id. 
179 Reeder, supra note 61, at 158–59. 
180 See id. at 164–65. 
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in joining the Episcopal Church, have no ability to join a diocese 
other than the one in which they are geographically located, and 
have no legal expertise to understand the property indications of 
the contract into which they are entering.181 These two factors 
suffer from the fewest flaws because, unlike the other factors, 
they provide reasons why a court should deviate from a contrac-
tual basis, rather than merely tossing the contract out in favor of 
other factors without explanation. Nonetheless, these factors are 
not without difficulties. It is true that members who joined a parish 
after the parish voted to join the Episcopal Church and adopt its 
canons did not themselves vote on these decisions. Reeder argues 
that this lack of personal voting should be interpreted—or at least 
can be interpreted—as a lack of consent to the canons in ques-
tion.182 This lack of consent would apparently render the canons 
unenforceable.183 That seems unusual; this is, after all, a volun-
tary organization, and one with a number of available substi-
tutes.184 Because the canons were already in place, these new 
members, had they wished to investigate the matter, could have 
fairly easily determined the rules which governed the parish’s re-
lationship to its diocese and to the Episcopal Church.185 The fact 
that the individual parish is associated with the larger Episcopal 
Church should be fairly obvious, even if one looks no further than 
the similarities in styling akin to a trademark.186 Because this is 
not a difficult connection to make, it would be odd to entirely ex-
cuse compliance with a contract on the basis that some members 
of an organization failed to inquire into the rules governing the 
organization.187 This also comes back to issues involved with some 
                                                                                                            
181 See id. at 166–67. 
182 Id. at 164–65. 
183 See id. 
184 Id. at 165. 
185 See Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 55 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2016). 
186 See id. 
187 See id. (discussing the governing structure of the Episcopal church); 
Denise Ping Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit 
Directors?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 930 (2003) (discussing how state statutes 
tend to give non-profits “complete freedom in establishing criteria for member-
ship and in determining what rights ... the members are to have.”); id. at 947 
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of Reeder’s other factors: why would a court be concerned with the 
lack of voting by particular members of the parish?188 The parish 
is a separate entity from its members, and the canons of the Church 
control the relationship not between the members of a parish and 
the diocese, but between the parish as a separate entity and the 
diocese.189 If this is the case, inquiry into member voting prefer-
ences would be fruitless. 
The bargaining power argument strikes a very different 
note. While not actually describing the adoption of diocesan rules 
as unconscionable, Reeder begins discussion of this factor with 
the idea of unconscionability.190 Under contract law, unconscion-
ability is an extreme standard, embodied in words such as a con-
tract which “no man ... not under delusion would make” and 
“which no fair and honest man would accept.”191 Clearly, parishes 
in the not-too-distant past voluntarily, and with full knowledge, 
voted to adopt these canons.192 If Reeder actually intends to call 
such agreements unconscionable, this is an extraordinary leap. 
Even if Reeder does not intend a full labelling of unconscionabil-
ity, her argument still assumes a sort of duress which forces new 
parishes into agreement with the canons of the Episcopal 
Church.193 She describes the Episcopal Church as being “[i]n some 
sense ... a monopoly supplier.”194 This is a curious claim. The Epis-
copal Church does not claim to be the only Christian organization 
                                                                                                            
(discussing the quasi-contractual relationship between donors and non-profit 
directors). 
188 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 165. 
189 See id. at 130 (discussing the relationship between the parish and dio-
cese); id. at 154 (stating that individual churches do not automatically assent 
to new canons. Canons are enacted and amended by a concurrent vote of the 
House of Deputies, comprised of clergy and laity, and the House of Bishops, 
comprised of bishops of all dioceses.). 
190 Id. at 166. 
191 Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889). 
192 Reeder, supra note 61, at 164–65 (“[A] parish membership’s consent at 
a given point in time to abide by the rule of the canons should not be read as a 
blanket agreement to the canons for all time, especially as the membership of 
the church changes.”). 
193 Id. at 165 (“Dead hands cannot maintain an infinite grip, especially in 
a voluntary organization such as a church.”). 
194 Id. at 166. 
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with valid orders, demonstrated by its relation to other Anglican 
churches and its ecumenical efforts.195 Additionally, there are a 
variety of denominations, both Anglican and non-Anglican, which 
structure their worship and daily life in a manner similar to that 
of the Episcopal Church.196 Had they wished to, the new parishes 
which Reeder is concerned about could have joined the exact same 
organizations that the departing parishes of San Joaquin 
joined.197 Reeder even tacitly acknowledges this point in the same 
paragraph where she ascribes the monopoly, saying in her foot-
note that some “U.S. parishes have left the Episcopalian Church 
in the U.S. and have joined ... [the Anglican] church in Nigeria ... 
[and] in Rwanda, Uganda, and various provinces in Latin Amer-
ica.”198 On grounds of both unconscionability and presumed mo-
nopoly power, Reeder’s argument for bargaining power is weak at 
best. 
There is perhaps also a corporate law analogy to be made 
in opposition to Reeder’s factors as a whole, though it is admittedly 
imprecise. Many non-profit organizations have come to be orga-
nized as corporations under various state laws.199 Though different 
from corporations used by other non-profits, the corporation sole 
used by the Diocese of San Joaquin bears some similarity.200 When 
donors contribute to a non-profit corporation, they are owed cer-
tain duties, as in for-profit corporate law, though these standards 
are somewhat relaxed.201 Beyond enforcing these duties, donors 
are not able to choose what happens to their funds.202 The officers 
of the non-profit organization control the decision making.203 If, de-
spite the delegation of power, the Episcopal Church has a unitary 
                                                                                                            
195 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 125 (discussing the Episcopal Church’s partic-
ipation in interdenominational societies). 
196 Id.; Ecumenical Relationships, supra note 38 (discussing the Reformed 
Episcopal Church); Provincial Affiliation, supra note 37 (discussing considera-
tion of joining the ACNA). 
197 See Reeder, supra note 61, at 166 n.186. 
198 Id. 
199 See Lee, supra note 187, at 930. 
200 See Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 67 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2016). 
201 See Lee, supra note 187, at 925. 
202 See id. at 949. 
203 Id. at 958 n.190 (discussing non-profit control). 
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polity, the concentration of power surely bears some resemblance 
to the corporate structure.204 The individual dioceses are asked to 
vote to approve changes to the governing documents of the dio-
cese, as are corporate shareholders.205 No matter how much a group 
of shareholders in the non-profit corporation wants to leave, the 
shareholders agreed to the corporate bylaws when they contrib-
uted funds, knowing that they would be unable to regain their 
donations.206 The continuance or discontinuance of donations, the 
expectations of the donors, and the changes in the pool of donors 
contributing to the organization would have absolutely no effect 
on the shareholders’ ability to take control of their own funds over 
the objection of the corporation.207 
When Reeder describes what the courts currently consider 
in Church property-splitting suits, the list of documents and facts 
that she lays out mimics the list of documents that would be con-
sidered in litigation over a non-profit corporation, mutatis mutandis: 
“church canons, the articles of incorporation, and perhaps a few 
other secular documents such as property deeds.”208 Presumably, 
Reeder does not envision her factors applying to non-church prop-
erty disputes. If donors and members of a non-profit corporation—
say, the ACLU—decided that the ACLU no longer represented 
their views, and thus chose to go to their local ACLU office, load 
up a truck with the office’s furniture, computers, and other prop-
erty—which were, of course, paid for with these member-donors’ 
funds—and cart them away, it is difficult to imagine a court pon-
dering the “expectations” of the member-donors when deciding 
whether or not to return the furniture to the ACLU. As noted be-
fore, this is an admittedly imprecise metaphor. It demonstrates, 
however, that if Reeder’s factors are to be considered plausible, 
there must be a relevant legal difference between a non-profit cor-
poration and the Episcopal Church’s polity. Reeder relies upon 
                                                                                                            
204 Reeder, supra note 61, at 155 (arguing that the Episcopal Church should 
act more like a corporation than a democratic government). 
205 Lee, supra note 187, at 930 (discussing that non-profits are made up of 
members who have voting power akin to shareholders); Governance of the Epis-
copal Church, supra note 6 (discussing how diocesan conventions vote on major 
policy decisions of the diocese). 
206 See Lee, supra note 187, at 946 n.127, 949. 
207 See id. at 946–47. 
208 Reeder, supra note 61, at 158. 
 
744 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:709 
the appearance of the Church’s polity to the exclusion of the ac-
tual polity.209 Just as a corporate board of directors can delegate 
power to local branches without losing any of its controlling power 
over those branches, the General Assembly of the Episcopal Church 
has tended to delegate power to the parishes and dioceses, but has 
firmly and unquestionably maintained power as a unitary polity.210 
Correcting this errant assumption about the Church, and main-
taining the assumption that Reeder’s factors would be largely 
misguided if applied to other non-profit corporations, it is difficult 
to imagine a relevant legal difference that would justify the ap-
plication of these rules to ecclesiastical property but not to other 
property held by a non-profit. 
2.  Hyden 
Reading Hyden’s argument, it appears—though it is not 
explicitly stated—that he believes introducing considerations of 
the Anglican Communion into court proceedings will yield results 
in favor of the secessionist dioceses and parishes.211 In recent 
years, the Anglican Communion has become known for its tumul-
tuous volatility, and some more pessimistic news sources continue 
to constantly herald its demise.212 Hyden portrays the Anglican 
Communion as a hierarchical structure, and he characterizes it 
as a structure that has authority over the Episcopal Church.213 
To support the claim that the Anglican Communion operates with 
authority, Hyden cites documents created by bodies within the 
Anglican Communion.214 Apparently, these documents are intended 
                                                                                                            
209 Id. 
210 See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 55 (quoting James A. Dator, The Government 
of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America: Confed-
eral, Federal, or Unitary? 245 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ameri-
can University)). 
211 Hyden, supra note 5, at 572. 
212 See, e.g., Andrew Brown, The Anglican Schism Over Sexuality Marks the 
End of the Global Church, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian 
.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/08/anglican-schism-sexuality-end-global-church 
-conservative-african-leaders-canterbury [https://perma.cc/BM92-SGDB] (alleging 
that the 2016 Primates Meeting, which did not end the Communion’s schism, 
would be the “funeral” of the Anglican Communion). 
213 Hyden, supra note 5, at 565–66. 
214 Id. at 567–68. 
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to show authority, but it is not entirely clear why this is the case. 
Hyden quotes a document, just before those citations, which 
states decisions from a body of the Anglican Communion “do not 
have canonical force,” but merely have “moral authority.”215 In 
other words, they have no authority. Nothing in the cited pas-
sages acts to counter this assertion. Hyden quotes a report from 
a body of the Anglican Communion which contains “recommenda-
tions” which “ask” the Episcopal Church to respond,216 and another 
report in which the body “request[s]” and “urge[s]” the Episcopal 
Church to act in a certain way.217 For an organization that sup-
posedly holds power over a subordinate Episcopal Church, this is 
surprisingly non-authoritative language. The system of organiza-
tion is certainly hierarchical, as Hyden establishes,218 but at-
tempting to ascribe “authority” to it is misplaced. In fact, one does 
not have to go any further than the menu of the Anglican Com-
munion website to find that the only authority that the Anglican 
Communion as a body maintains is the authority to make “recom-
mendations” which are intended to “guide[ ]” the actions of the 
members of the Communion.219 
Another aspect of potential authority could be the author-
ity to remove a member church from the Anglican Communion, 
which is certainly true, but beyond this the Anglican Church has 
no ability to influence the ongoing activities of a member such as 
the Episcopal Church.220 Not all churches that present themselves 
as Anglican are members of the Anglican Communion, so mem-
bership is arguably not an integral part of the identity of any par-
ticular church. And, as noted above, the potential fracture of the 
Communion has been considered imminent by some commentators 
for at least the past decade,221 and this threat will likely continue 
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into the future as members of the Communion continue to strug-
gle with many of the issues from which the controversy has 
arisen.222 Thus, one of the foundational claims of Hyden’s argu-
ment seems to be a mischaracterization. 
Setting aside this doubt, however, it is unclear whether or 
not a court’s consideration of the role of the Anglican Communion 
would actually change the outcome of a property-splitting suit. 
The Living Relationship Test that Hyden proposes courts adopt 
requires courts to set aside the standard documents seen in neu-
tral principles analysis, such as “deeds, articles of incorporation 
and like documents,” and instead decide the suit based on an ex-
amination of “the rituals and practices of the churches in dispute 
to determine the governmental relationship or polity prevail-
ing.”223 With this approach, there is the danger—as seen in the 
discussion of Reeder224—that the court would mistake the grant 
of authority by the General Assembly of the Episcopal Church for 
a confederal polity.225 Hyden, though, envisions two specific facts 
from a parish’s rituals and practices to be included in adjudica-
tion: first, a parish’s expression that it does not desire to remain 
loyal to its diocese, as manifested in the parish’s refusal to pay 
annual assessments to the diocese or national church and/or its 
refusal to accept the diocesan bishop’s authority; and second, if 
the parish leaves the Episcopal Church but realigns “with an-
other Anglican Church,” which means that it “remains within the 
Anglican Communion” and thus does not have its property “with-
drawn from the international church.”226 The first consideration 
raises similar concerns to those seen in Reeder, in that it involves 
asking why a court should set aside an established contractual 
relationship in favor of a loosely defined and newly developed 
preference.227 The second is a more interesting suggestion, but the 
actual application of this principle is difficult to envision. Suppose 
that a court deciding a property-splitting suit acknowledges that 
a parish has realigned with a different member of the Anglican 
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Communion after its succession from the Episcopal Church. What 
does it do next? This certainly is not a trivial fact, but how exactly 
is a court supposed to “give weight” to this affiliation? Prior to 
realignment, the parish likely had very little, if any, contact with 
other members of the Anglican Communion, and the parish most 
likely gave very little attention at all to the loosely affiliated in-
ternational group of churches which meets only periodically. Pre-
sumably, the weight given to the realignment is supposed to go in 
favor of the parish’s ownership of church property, but why? And, 
if this realignment goes in favor of the parish’s ownership, is a 
parish which leaves the Episcopal Church but chooses to realign 
with an Anglican Church that is not a member of the Anglican 
Communion more deserving of having its property taken away? 
What if a parish continues to call itself Anglican but does not re-
align with any group? What if a parish realigns with a different 
denomination, perhaps becoming an Anglican Rite Roman Cath-
olic Church? Would a parish that continued in an Anglican style 
be favorable to one which, say, opted for a Lutheran affiliation? 
Introducing the role of the Anglican Communion into adjudica-
tion provides no clear answers, nor a clearly appropriate amount 
of probative value, and seemingly opens the door to a variety of 
questions related to denominational alignment which courts are 
likely not prepared to deal with. 
The suggestions made by Reeder and Hyden both contrib-
ute to the discussion about church property-splitting cases,228 but, 
as demonstrated, straying from a mere evaluation of documents 
would place a court in position in which it has to decide a number 
of crucial questions.229 These questions, as suggested above,230 are 
fraught with difficulty when it comes to actual application. For 
most, it is unclear how any court could possibly make a systematic 
decision on a particular question that would maintain applicability 
across cases. If this is not possible, the suggested improvements 
place courts in the situation of having to make potentially arbi-
trary distinctions and denotations and having to assign probative 
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value more or less at whim.231 In contrast, the neutral principles 
approach requires very little of this: it concerns tangible pieces of 
documentary evidence and asks courts to perform analysis on top-
ics with which they have a high degree of familiarity.232 When 
such a possibility remains open to courts, it is hard to see why a 
court would choose either set of suggested improvements. 
CONCLUSION 
Leading up to much of the contentious Episcopal Church 
property-splitting litigation, a number of scholars proposed ways 
in which they believed that the doctrine of neutral principles of 
law could be improved.233 These proposals largely hinged on ask-
ing courts to take more factors into consideration when deciding 
the lawsuits.234 The hope, it would seem, was that the introduc-
tion of additional factors and considerations would provide a more 
just result for the schismatic parties, even if this came at the cost 
of muddling the decisions and potentially creating conflicting rul-
ings on similar facts.235 Gunner, as—for the moment—one of the 
last Episcopal Church property-splitting suits and therefore the 
decision with the most commentary and case law available, pro-
vides a convenient demarcation to examine whether any of the 
proposed additions were actually taken into account. While some 
of the topics of these suggestions were introduced into the court 
decisions, their introduction was largely fleeting and did not seem 
to strongly influence the court’s decision-making process.236 This, 
therefore, brings another question to the front: considering the 
minimal impact of the factors that were included, if these pro-
posals had all been applied in Gunner, would they have made any 
difference to the outcome? As noted above, the introduction of ex-
traneous factors would, if nothing else, remove the institutionally 
driven clarity that exists in the current neutral principles approach. 
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However, this uncertainty aside, there is not a compelling reason 
to think that the proposals would have had a consistent dispositive 
impact. The additional considerations, while perhaps providing some 
support for the Schofield party, do not propose anything compel-
ling. There is no consistent way to determine intentions considering 
the history of the diocese, and while an organizational realign-
ment to another party in the Anglican Communion did take place, 
there is no provided reason why this realignment should preempt 
one national church’s canon law in favor of another, especially 
with the decentralized nature of the Anglican Communion. As long 
as the neutral principles of law approach is applied in its current 
manner, the results are likely to remain consistent with those of 
the past, even if courts were to fully take into account the entire 
range of proposed factors. 
 
 
